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Rx Marketplace Dynamics
The pharmaceutical marketplace is a complex amal-
gam of competing interests. There is no one specific
pharmaceutical marketplace. There is no one price for a
specific drug product. There are multiple customers,
multiple distribution channels, multiple prescription drug
reimbursement systems, multiple purchasing arrange-
ments, multiple pricing methodologies, multiple market-
ing techniques, and multiple cost control tools. As history
has shown, legislation, regulation, and market adjust-
ments in one sector of the market often result in a chain
reaction of intended and unintended consequences
throughout the entire pharmaceutical marketplace.
Lawmakers considering how best to provide outpa-
tient prescription drugs to Medicare beneficiaries are
keenly aware of these consequences. As the debate
continues, numerous issues and questions have been
raised. The answers, however, are often cloaked in
rhetoric and blanketed in politics. Terms meaning differ-
ent things to different people are tossed around freely.
The economics of the pharmaceutical marketplace are
extremely complex: the companies themselves range in
size from newly merged behemoths to very small one-
product start-ups; some of the manufacturers are multina-
tional, spanning the globe, while others are domestic and
still others are foreign companies seeking to do business
in America. Despite their differences, each company has
the identical goal—to be profitable. Herein lies the rub.
The prescription drug industry—the most profitable of all
U.S. industries, based on revenue, equity and assets,
according to Fortune Magazine—represents both the
greatest strengths and the greatest weaknesses of Amer-
ican capitalism. “Hardly a day has gone by lately without
some new reflection of the tension between the commer-
cial and scientific accomplishments of the drug compa-
nies on the one hand, and the disparity in the spread of the
benefits from those accomplishments.”1
Much of today’s political dialogue revolves around
the notion of profitability and “public good.” How
much profit is too much? Who should decide? Profit-
ability and price, patents and promise—all are at the
core of today’s congressional debates. Arguments fly
around Capitol Hill: on the one hand, many of the
elderly upset with the high cost of drugs are delighted
when their drug company stock dividends continue to
soar; on the other hand, those representing the low-
income elderly argue that seniors should not have to
choose between necessities to be able to afford life-
sustaining medication. Some groups claim that the only
way Medicare beneficiaries can afford their drugs is to
buy them in Canada or Mexico; others point out that
problems are so great in the health care systems in these
countries that Canadian and other citizens are coming
by busloads into America to purchase care. These
arguments hold for the non-elderly as well.
In an effort to get beyond the hype, the Forum has
organized this background briefing. The session has been
structured as a one-half day institute, a tutorial on pharma-
ceutical marketplace dynamics. It will explain how the
marketplace works by exploring a number of topics,
including competition, generics, intellectual property,
research and development, pricing, distribution, and
current federal programs such as the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs federal supply schedule and Medicaid
rebates. Following this discussion will be a luncheon
briefing highlighting Prescription Drug Coverage,
Spending, Utilization, and Prices, the April 2000 report
to the president from the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS).
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
PROFILE
According to a new University of Maryland School of
Pharmacy study sponsored by the BlueCross BlueShield
Association of America and reported in the April 24,
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2000, issue of Medicine and Health, “U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal spending in 2004 will total $212 billion—more than
twice last year’s total of $105 billion.” The study also
reports that “prescription drug spending will rise 15-to-18
percent annually over the next five years.”
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the United States
is the largest market for pharmaceuticals, accounting for
approximately one-third of global pharmaceutical sales
(Figure 1).
Although there are hundreds of U.S. pharmaceutical
companies today, including large and small firms
producing both branded and generic products, IMS data
indicate that the 100 U.S. companies with the greatest
dollar volume of sales make up approximately 96
percent of the U.S. market. “PhRMA reported that the
domestic U.S. sales of its members (nearly all of the
approximately 100 major research-intensive brand name
manufacturers) were $81 billion in 1998. In contrast, the
generic industry reported sales of $8 billion in 1998.”2
In recent years, numerous mergers and acquisitions
(see Table 1) have brought about a major shift in the
pharmaceutical landscape—with staggering results.
For example,
the combined R&D [research and development]
budget of the newly merged Glaxo Wellcome and
SmithKline Beecham is on par with that of the entire
National Cancer Institute and is approximately 10
times the research budget of the private Howard
Hughes Medical Institute.3
Table 1
Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
2000 Pfizer and Warner-Lambert
2000 Glaxo Wellcome PLC and SmithKline
Beecham
1998 Hoechst AG and Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
1998 Sanofi Sl and Synthelabo
1998 Zeneca and Astra
1997 Hoffmann-La Roche and Boehringer
Mannheim
1997 Nycomed and Amersham
1996 CibaGeigy and Sandoz
1996 Elan and Athena Neurosciences
1995 Knoll and Boots
1995 Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome
1995 Gynopharma and Ortho-McNeil
1995 Hoechst-Roussel and Marion Merrell Dow
1995 Pharmacia and Upjohn
1995 Rhone-Poulenc Rorer and Fisons
1995 Schwarz Pharma and Reed & Carnrick
1994 American Home and American Cyanamid
1994 Hoffman-La Roche and Syntex
1994 Pharmacia and Erbamont
1994 Sanofi and Sterling (prescription drug
operation)
1994 SmithKline Beecham and Sterling (over-the-
counter pharmaceutical unit)
1991 SmithKline and Beecham
1990 Boots and Flint
1990 Pharmacia and Kabi
1990 Rhone-Poulenc and Rorer
1989 American Home and A.H. Robins
1989 Bristol-Myers and Squibb
1989 Dow and Marion
1988 Kodak and Sterling
1986 Schering-Plough and Key
1985 Monsanto and Searle
1985 Rorer and USV/Armour
Source: Windhover’s Health Care Strategist, 1999.
Figure 1
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Industry officials argue that, although these newly
merged titans are vast, they hold a relatively small share
of the total drug market. The flip side, according to
critics, is that individual companies dominate specific
therapeutic markets. For example, “Schering-Plough
controls 40 percent of the market for allergy medicines;
and Warner-Lambert controls 48 percent of the market for
cholesterol drugs. Glaxo SmithKline, as the new company
will be called, will dominate the market for asthma,
AIDS, and migraine drugs, as well as for vaccines.”4
Consumer advocates are worried that these mergers
could lead to fewer drug products and higher prices.
Company spokespersons point out that merger and
acquisitions ultimately benefit consumers by strength-
ening their R&D pipelines.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and development in the pharmaceutical
arena is risky business. According to PhRMA,
 U.S. pharmaceutical companies will spend $26.4
billion this year to discover and develop new
medicines.
 It costs an average of $500 million to discover and
develop just one new medicine. It takes nearly 15
years from the time a drug is discovered in the
laboratory until it gets to the drug store.
 The United States leads the world in developing
new medicines. Of the 152 major medicines
launched worldwide over the last 20 years, U.S.
companies developed nearly half.
 Pharmaceutical companies now put back $1 out of
every $5 in revenues for R&D.
Over the years, the relationship between pharmaceu-
tical R&D and profit—18.5 percent return on gross
revenues in 1998, among pharmaceutical firms in the
Fortune 500—have ignited heated discussions in and
around Capitol Hill. Studies have been commissioned,
hearings have been held, and countless policy debates
have taken place. But, points of contention remain.
On the one hand, says Stephen Schondelmeyer, a
pharmacoeconomist and professor in the University of
Minnesota’s College of Pharmacy,
the drug companies give the impression that they need
those profits to fund R&D. But, no, that’s not true.
The 18.5 percent profit is accounted for separately
from the 20 percent they say they spend on R&D. . . .
On average, for every $100 spent on a drug at the
manufacturer’s level, the actual cost of making it is
about $10 to $15. A further $20 goes to R&D. About
$15 goes to taxes and administrative costs. About $30
goes to advertising and marketing. And about $20 is
profit.5
When asked if the industry could afford to lower its
drug prices, given its robust profit margins, the industry
answer is “Without reasonable returns on R&D invest-
ments, companies will not attract the investment capital
needed to fund ongoing research to discover and
develop lifesaving, cost-effective medicines, of which
about 600 are in the pipeline.”6 The president of
PhRMA, Alan F. Holmer, has reiterated in written
statements and in testimony that, should market dynam-
ics and legislative action negatively affect prices and
profits, R&D activity would not come to a screeching
halt; rather, research cutbacks would ensue and priori-
ties would shift, effectively placing some diseases on
the research “back burner.”
In many ways, companies are being forced to rethink
their R&D portfolios as the very nature of R&D itself
is changing. As a result of sophisticated new tools, such
as computer modeling, 3-D computer-visualization
techniques, combinational chemistry, and X-ray crystal-
lography, the process of discovery, while still somewhat
serendipitous, is much less haphazard than it was 20
years ago.
As the biotechnology revolution advances and as the
Human Genome Project is completed, the very essence
of our understanding of disease and therapy is undergo-
ing a profound shift. Scientists today now realize that
many diseases are actually a collection of several
different diseases, each with a unique molecular cause.
The idea, therefore, of identifying a magic bullet that
works for all cancer or all heart disease seems increas-
ingly naive. Not surprisingly, big drug companies are
terrified by a future in which they must develop a
different drug for each type of hypertension, rather
than a single blockbuster product.7
These scientific advances could prove to be a double-
edged sword for some pharmaceutical companies.
For big pharmaceutical companies, the inevitable loss
of market share caused by niche drug production will
be offset both by the opportunity to intensify collabo-
rations with thoughtful clinical investigators, and the
ability to discover, develop and market new drugs
more economically. The large R&D budgets afforded
by the recent pharmaceutical mergers offer the oppor-
tunity to set aside a fraction of these resources to
explore such an approach. If big drug companies don’t
seize this moment, someone else will.8
Today, innovation and discovery are occurring not
only inside but also outside the large pharmaceutical
companies.
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Drug mergers could create a crisis in innovation,
turning today’s pharmaceutical giants into tomorrow’s
distribution centers, reliant on more creative outside
research firms. To avoid this, big companies will have
to divert some of their research money into new, more
effective approaches to drug creation.9
The market will continue to reconfigure itself as the
“race for the cures” continues.
Along these lines, the Wall Street Journal reported the
following in a February 9, 2000, article, “After Drug-Firm
Mergers, the Prescription Is on the Wall for More”:
Pharmaceutical companies have been scooping up
biotech concerns for their drug prospects. . . . But that
was when biotech stocks were out of favor and drug
stocks were strong. Due to the recent rise in biotech
stocks, many trade at multiples greatly higher than
traditional pharmaceutical companies. This makes
many targets prohibitively expensive. . . . Though it
seems far-fetched, one investor said he wouldn’t be
surprised to see a major biotech company such as
Amgen acquire a traditional pharmaceutical concern
for its sales and marketing.
It is clear that as the secrets of genomics are
demystified, promising new miracle products (drugs
may no longer be the correct term) will become avail-
able. Financing and discovering these products are only
part of the risk for a company. The ability to recoup
R&D investments is another.
PATENTS
Patent protection is essential for companies invest-
ing in pharmaceutical R&D. Unlike many other techno-
logical advances, a drug product, once discovered, is
relatively easy to reproduce. Without the period of
market exclusivity that patents provide, companies
would not have the opportunity to recoup their R&D
investments. Some argue that patents provide a monop-
oly, a barrier to market entry for competing products.
The other side of that has been articulated by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO):
Patents do not grant complete monopoly power in the
pharmaceutical industry. The reason is that companies
can frequently discover and patent several different
drugs that use the same basic mechanism to treat an
illness. The first drug using the new mechanism to
treat that illness—the breakthrough drug—usually has
between one and six years on the market before a
therapeutically similar patented drug (sometimes
called a ‘me-too’ drug) is introduced.10
As the future of medical research itself changes, patent
policy will face interesting challenges. For example, the
area of genetic research has raised significant issues, such
as what is patentable (that is, are gene sequences bona
fide inventions?).11 As reported in the February 21, 2000,
American Medical News article “Gene Patents Raise
Concerns for Researchers, Clinicians,” by Vida Foubister:
“The proliferation of patents for specific gene sequences
may increase costs and decrease quality of diagnostic
laboratory testing, limiting access for patients and training
opportunities for physicians.”
While the future of patenting and biotechnology is
still unfolding, past patent legislation and regulation are
still affecting today’s pharmaceutical market. This is
true both domestically and abroad, where patent piracy
costs the industry hundreds of millions of dollars a year,
despite various provisions agreed to in NAFTA (the
North American Free Trade Agreement) and GATT
(the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act
Domestically, the prescription drug market was
radically altered with the passage of the 1984 Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
(commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act after
its authors, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch [R-Utah] and Rep.
Henry A. Waxman [D-Calif.]). The act was
intended to strike a balance between promoting
innovation (by guaranteeing makers of brand-name
drugs a certain number of patent years) and ensuring
that consumers have timely access to lower-cost
generic medicines (by guaranteeing makers of generic
drugs that those patents would eventually end).12
GENERICS
Since the 1980s, the use of generics has continued to
increase (see Table 2). Along with the passage of Hatch-
Waxman, the passage of drug-product substitution laws
(at the state level) allowing pharmacists to dispense a
generic, even in the case of a brand-name prescription,
and the active promotion of generic substitution by
government health programs and private health plans
have all spurred the increase in generic sales.
Some analysts, such as Elliot Wilbur, a securities
analyst with CIBC World Markets in Los Angeles, are
of the opinion that
The coming bull market in generics’ stocks will be
fueled by a never-before-seen combination of surging
supply and powerful demand. On the supply side,
Wilbur points out that more than $30 billion worth of
brand-name drugs will go off patent over the next five
years. That’s more than six times the dollar level that
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Table 2
Prescription Drugs Facts and Figures
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Rx Sales (in billions of dollars)
   Total 54.3 58.6 64.4 72.1 81.2 94.0
   Brands 48.5 51.6 56.5 64.6 73.4 86.0
   Generics 5.8 7.0 7.9 7.5 7.8 8.0
% of Total Rx Sales
   Brands 89.4 88.1 87.8 89.6 90.4 91.4
   Generics 10.6 11.9 12.2 10.4 9.6 8.6
No. of Prescriptions Sold (in billions)
   Total NA 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6
   Brands NA 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5
   Generics NA 0.8 6 0.92 0.98 1.0 1.1
 % of Total No. of Prescriptions Sold
   Brands 61.4 59.1 58.0 57.5 58.0 58.7
   Generics 38.6 40.9 42.0 42.5 42.0 41.3
Source: Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association; accessed April 27, 2000, at http://www. gpia.org/edu_facts.html
has been available to the generic industry over the past
four years. At the same time, says Wilbur, nearly half
of all HMOs now include generic compliance stipula-
tions as part of their financial incentive packages
offered to physicians. Wilbur anticipates that number
will climb to 75 percent over the next five years.13
The opportunity for expansion of generic sales is
further illustrated in Figure 2.
With a significant number of top-selling prescription
drugs coming off patent in the next few years (Table 3),
brand-name research pharmaceutical companies are
seeking ways to extend their patent protection. One
option has been to revise the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.
While Waxman agrees that the market is different today
and recognizes the changing nature of the drug products,
he has expressed concern over the motivations of some
of the companies seeking legislative revisions. In a
recent speech to an industry group, Waxman articulated
the need to stop—once and for all—the numerous
efforts to obtain patent extensions benefitting a few at
the expense of many. I am talking about efforts to
secure special patent extensions and special exten-
sions of market exclusivity, in direct contravention of
the Waxman-Hatch Act and its underlying purpose.14
Figure 2
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Table 3
Top 20 Prescription Drugs Coming Off Patent by December 31, 2005
Brand Drug Generic Name Patent Holder Indication PatentExpires
1998 U.S. Sales
(in millions of $)
Prilosec omeprazole Astra Merck duodenal ulcers 4/1/01 2,933
Prozac fluoxetine HCL Lilly depression 2/2/01 2,271
Zocor simvastatin Merck hypercholesterolemia 12/24/05 2,170
Claritin loratadine Schering-Plough allergies 4/21/04 1,800
Vasotec enalapril maleate Merck hypertension 2/22/00 1,010
Biaxin clarithromycin Abbott respiratory infection 5/23/03 624
Pravachol pravastatin Bristol-Myers Squibb hypercholesterolemia 10/20/05 1,022
Pepcid famotidine Merck duodenal ulcers 10/17/00 1,005
Cipro ciprofloxacin HCL Bayer infection 12/9/03 779
Mevacor lovastatin Merck hypercholesterolemia 6/15/01 595
Zithromax azithromycin Pfizer infection 10/14/05 775
Glucophage metformin HCL Bristol-Myers Squibb diabetes 3/3/00 854
Hytrin terazosin Abbott hypertension 2/17/00 546
Zestril lisinopril Zeneca hypertension 12/30/01 549
Relafen nabumetone SmithKline Beecham arthritis 12/13/02 449
Zofran ondansetron Glaxo-Wellcome nausea 6/25/05 442
Buspar buspirone Bristol-Myers Squibb anxiety disorder 5/22/00 490
Axid nizatidine Lilly duodenal ulcers 4/12/02 301
Ceftin cefuroxime axetil Glaxo-Wellcome infection 5/12/00 365
Diflucan fluconazole Pfizer infection 1/29/04 440
Source: Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association; accessed April 27, 2000, at http://www. gpia.org/edu_top20 drugs.html
Seven companies are seeking legislation that would
lengthen patent-term extensions from the Patent and
Trademark Office. Companies such as Schering-
Plough, which produces Claritin, argue that Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval delays wasted
several years of patent protection. However, as noted in
the earlier-mentioned CBO study on generics and
competition, amending Hatch-Waxman to lengthen
patent-term extensions
would not encourage innovation as much as accelerat-
ing the FDA approval process by the same amount
would. The reason is that lengthening patent terms
increases profits today for drugs whose patents are
about to expire, but it does not have as great an impact
on the incentive to invest in R&D—that is, on the
expected average value of the profits from marketing
a drug. CBO calculates that increasing the average
patent term by one year would raise the expected
value of those profits by about $12 million in 1990
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dollars. Accelerating the FDA review period by one
year would boost returns by much more—about $22
million in 1990 dollars.
Generic Equivalents: Today and Tomorrow
According to the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
Association, the FDA uses three terms to describe
generic drug products: pharmaceutical equivalence,
bioequivalence, and therapeutic equivalence. Each is
discussed below.
 Pharmaceutical equivalence—drug products are
considered pharmaceutical equivalents if they
have the same active ingredient(s), the same
dosage form and are identical in strength as the
brand-name product. Even if a generic has a
different color, a different taste, or comes in a
different shape or package, the FDA considers the
product to be equivalent if it meets the same
standards for strength, quality, purity and identity
as the branded product.
 Bioequivalence—a generic drug is considered
bioequivalent if it is absorbed in the bloodstream
at the “same rate and extent” as the brand drug.
 Therapeutic equivalence—a generic drug is
considered therapeutically equivalent to the
comparable brand when the FDA determines the
generic is safe and effective, pharmaceutically
equivalent, and bioequivalent.
Because biologics (for example, human growth
hormone) are difficult to produce and because the FDA
currently has no mechanism for measuring the equiva-
lency of generic biotech-based drug products, produc-
ing generics in the future will become more compli-
cated. “For the forseeable future, generic manufacturers
essentially have to repeat all the development and
approval steps that the patent producers do.”15 The
overall effect of this on the market, on competition, and
on price, sales, and expenditures remains to be seen.
DRUG EXPENDITURES
As reported in the March 2000 Kaiser Family Foun-
dation white paper, “Medicare and Prescription Drugs,”
Pharmaceuticals are the fastest-growing component of
national health expenditures. In 2000, national drug
spending increased by an estimated 11% compared
with 7% for physician services and 6% for hospital
care. Since 1990, national spending for prescription
drugs has tripled. By 2008, that figure is expected to
more than double from an estimated $112 billion
today to $243 billion.
(See Figure 3.)
Three factors have contributed to the recent in-
creases in pharmaceutical budgets: unit cost inflation,
utilization (that is, increases in the absolute number of
prescriptions), and intensity (that is, availability of new
drug technologies).
Fueling the increase in utilization is the explosion of
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising by the pharma-
ceutical companies. The National Institute for Health
Care Management’s July 1999 study, “Factors Affect-
ing the Growth of Prescription Drug Expenditures,”
reported that “the 10 drugs most heavily advertised
directly to consumers in 1998 accounted for $9.3 billion
or about 22 percent of the total increase in drug spend-
ing between 1993 and 1998.” The study, citing data
from the Scott-Levin Source Prescription Audit Data,
found that in 1998 pharmaceutical companies spent
$8.3 billion promoting their products in the United
States, of which approximately $1.3 billion was spent
on DTC advertising and $7.0 billion on advertising and
detailing to health care professionals.
Figure 3
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Other nonprice factors explaining the growth in total
drug expenditures include demographic changes (a
growing elderly population, changing chronic disease
prevalence patterns); the growth in third-party drug
coverage, which tends to drive demand; record sales of
new products; new product formulations; changing mix
of products used; patient noncompliance; and inappro-
priate prescribing. Another way of looking at total drug
expenditures is shown in Figure 4.
PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING:
MULTIPLE MARKETS, MULTIPLE
PRICES
As indicated above, pricing alone does not account
for the total growth in drug expenditures. But it does, of
course, play a role, especially for newer products, many
of which are currently working their way through the
R&D pipeline.
Defining and comparing pharmaceutical prices is
complicated and not always consistent—many terms are
used and many methodologies are employed.16 There is
no one way to price a product. A variety of factors are
considered in drug pricing, among them the relative
commercial success of the agent; the prices, product
features, and past actions of the competition; specific
patient characteristics; the economic and social value of
the therapy itself; the decision-making criteria of
prescribers and those who influence that decision;
company needs in terms of market position, revenue,
and other considerations; the current and anticipated
insurance reimbursement environment; company
abilities, including available budgets and willingness to
support the project; and the type of manufacturer
supplying the drug.17
The importance of competitive analysis in pricing
cannot be overstated. It has been suggested by many
researchers that the pricing and presence of com-
petitors, together with the uniqueness or therapeutic
value of the new product, are the major determinants
of launch prices.18
Three basic pricing strategies, each chosen to maximize
a competitive edge are described by E. M. Kolassa
below:
 Skimming—The product, anticipating little direct
competition, is priced above prevailing levels to
maximize profits. Prilosec, the first proton pump
inhibitor, was priced in this manner, substantially
above the price of the H2 antagonists.
 Parity—The product is viewed internally as being
little or no different from current competitors and
is priced equivalent to the prevailing levels. The
nonsedating antihistamine Claritin and the ACE
inhibitor Accupril were priced at parity to the
market leaders at the times of their launches.
 Penetration—A product is viewed as equal to or
slightly inferior to current or anticipated offerings
and is priced below prevailing levels in hopes of
gaining market share with its low price or of
erecting a barrier to entry for anticipated future
competitors. Lescol appears to be the only phar-
maceutical product to have successfully employed
a penetration pricing strategy.19
Manufacturers use these various pricing methodolo-
gies depending upon internal strategies, external forces,
distribution channels, and specific purchasers. As
external market forces change, internal pricing strate-
gies also change (see Figure 5).
A specific drug product can be priced differently in
different markets, at different points in the distribution
Figure 4
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chain, and for different purchasers. Domestically, the
pharmaceutical market can be broken down into various
segments essentially falling into two broad categories:
private markets and government programs. Markets can
be segmented in other ways as well, such as by branded
and generic as well as chronic and acute.
The Private Market
The private marketplace includes retail (which
comprises traditional chain drug stores, mass merchan-
disers, independent pharmacies, supermarket pharma-
cies, and mail order pharmacies); wholesale; hospital;
managed care organizations and providers (such as
clinics, long-term care facilities—including nursing
homes—outpatient facilities, and physician offices);
and the Internet.
Retail, Wholesale, Mail Order and the Internet.  On
its Web site (www.nacds.org), the National Association
of Chain Drug Stores (NACDS) reports the following
figures:
 Nationwide, there are more than 30,000 pharmacies
operated by traditional chain pharmacy companies,
supermarkets, and mass merchants. In addition,
there are another 20,000 independent pharmacies.
 In recent years, the retail prescription drug indus-
try has grown dramatically. The number of retail
prescriptions dispensed each year increased from
2.0 billion in 1992 to 2.6 billion in 1997. This
represents a 23 percent increase in just five years.
In 1998, this number reached 2.73 billion.
 The chain pharmacy is the leading component of
this industry. It dispenses more than 60 percent of
these prescriptions, which equals 1.6 billion
prescriptions a year or 4 million each day.
According to data from the April 2000 DHHS ASPE
report, Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utiliza-
tion, and Prices:
 Over the past few years, the wholesale drug
industry has become quite concentrated. While
there are still a number of wholesalers in opera-
tion, the top five wholesalers account for 90
percent of the entire wholesale drug market.20 In
1998, the net sales of prescription drugs by whole-
salers were $57 billion.
 Mail order pharmacy accounts for about 12 per-
cent of the total retail prescription market. Be-
tween 1997 and 1998 mail service pharmacy grew
by 19 percent.21 This compares to the total pre-
scription market, which grew by 18.5 percent.22 It
is interesting to note that Internet pharmacies use
mail order to distribute their products and are
members of the mail order pharmacies’ profes-
sional organization.
Figure 5
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Government Programs
The federal market encompasses such government
programs as the Federal Employee Health Benefit
program, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and
its federal supply schedule (FSS), Medicaid, and
various public health service programs. Various govern-
ment programs have legislated drug pricing and reim-
bursement methodologies.
The VA Federal Supply Schedule. The Veterans
Health Care Act established a mandatory federal ceiling
price on a manufacturer’s sales of innovator medicines
to four federal agencies: the VA, the Department of
Defense, the Public Health Service (including the
Indian Health Service), and the Coast Guard. The
formula establishes an upper limit on all procurements
by any of the four agencies equal to 76 percent of the
weighted average nonfederal selling price for the
product, limited to annual increases of no more than the
increase in the consumer price index-urban (CPI-U).
The FSS generally limits annual increases in any
pharmaceutical price over the life of a contract (typi-
cally five years) to the increase in the CPI-U over the
same period.
Medicaid Rebates. The Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990 (OBRA) established the Medicaid
rebate program. The basic formula requires that, in
exchange for having their products reimbursed (that is,
on the formulary), pharmaceutical manufacturers rebate
to the states the greater of (a) 15.1 percent of the
average manufacturer price (AMP)23 paid by wholesal-
ers for brand-name drugs that Medicaid beneficiaries
purchase as outpatients or (b) the difference between
AMP and the manufacturer’s “best price.” The best
price is the lowest price offered to any other customer,
excluding FSS prices and prices to state pharmaceutical
assistance programs. Similarly, manufacturers pay a
rebate equal to 11 percent of the AMP on generic and
over-the-counter drugs.
If a brand-name drug’s AMP increases faster than the
inflation rate, an additional rebate is imposed so that
manufacturers cannot offset the basic rebate by raising
their AMP. The additional rebate is equal to the
difference between the current AMP and a base-year
AMP increased by the inflation rate as measured by
the consumer price index.24
OBRA 93 changed the pricing schedule of single-
source and innovator multiple-source drugs approved
by the FDA after October 1990.
In general, OBRA 93 had an impact on the computa-
tion of the unit rebate amount for covered outpatient
drugs. The effective date for implementation of
OBRA 93 was October 1, 1993. Presently, more than
500 manufacturers have rebate agreements with the
Federal Government which, in turn, address approxi-
mately 55,000 drug products.25
Medicaid—which accounted for over $2.2 billion
worth of pharmaceutical manufacturer rebates in
1997—is not alone in its use of rebates. As the number
of HMOs and PBMs increased, manufacturers began
to offer rebates in an effort to gain access to managed
care patients.26
These programs add another dimension to drug
pricing variability. The price a manufacturer sets often
changes as it makes its way through the distribution
chain and onto the negotiating table. It is not unusual
for one specific product to be priced differently in
different markets (see Table 4).
Many cross-national drug pricing comparisons have
been made over the years. While these findings are
significant, they merit caution in how the comparisons
are made and in how the conclusions are drawn. Be-
cause markets, demographics, and values vary, and
because medical practices and economic circumstances
also vary, it is difficult simply to transfer one country’s
pricing methods to another. Nevertheless, for many
reasons, price differentials between products purchased
in the U.S. and other countries are oftentimes substan-
tial, leaving many to question why the gap is so wide as
well as whether and how it should be narrowed.
THE FORUM SESSION
This Forum session, designed as an institute provid-
ing background information as well as raising policy
issues, will begin with a discussion of the supply side of
the market. Glenna M. Crooks, Ph.D., president and
chief executive officer, Strategic Health Policy Interna-
tional, will open with a discussion of “The Price of
Innovation: Internal R&D Decisions,” answering
questions such as the following: How are R&D deci-
sions made? Who makes them? How has the nature of
R&D changed over the past decade or two (for exam-
ple, greater reliance on computers and government/
academic funded research, fewer “hit and miss” scenar-
ios, big companies as holding companies for innovation
investments, and strategic alliances)? How is risk
spread across classes of drugs? How is R&D in big
companies different from R&D in small companies?
Judith L. Wagner, Ph.D., principal analyst with the
Congressional Budget Office, will provide a briefing on
“Pharmaceutical Marketplace Dynamics,” covering a
multitude of questions, including the following: How
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Table 4
Illustrative Example of Pricing for Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Cash Customers
(No 3rd-Party
Payment at
Point of Sale)
Insurers and
PBMs HMO* Medicaid
Federal Sup-
ply Schedule
List price (AWP) $50
Manufacturer’s price (manufac-
turer to wholesaler or other entity)
$40
(AWP-20%)
$40**
(AWP-20%)
$34
(AWP-33%) $40**
$24
(AWP-52%)
Acquisition price
(wholesaler to pharmacy) $41 $41 n/a $41 n/a
Retail price at pharmacy (total of
amounts paid by customer and re-
imbursed by 3rd-party payer)
$52
(AWP+4%)
$46**
(AWP-13%
+$2.50)
n/a $41 +$2.50 n/a
Retail price, less typical manufac-
turer rebate n/a
$30 to $44
(5% to 35%
rebate)
n/a
$30 to $37
(15.1% to
30% rebate)
n/a
Ultimate (net) amount paid by final
purchaser and/or consumer $52 $30 to $44 $34 (avg.)
$30 to $37
$34 (avg.) $24
Source: Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending,
Utilization, and Prices, Department of Health and Human Services, April 2000, 98.
n/a = not applicable
* This column refers only to HMOs that buy directly from manufacturers.
** without rebate
Notes: (1) Prices are based on a composite of several commonly prescribed brand-name drugs for a typical quantity of pills. For some
cells in the table, the relative relationships have been calculated based on relationships reported in How Increased Competition
from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry (CBO, 1998) study and on other
relationships widely reported by industry sources.
(2) These prices are used for illustrative purposes only and do not represent any type of overall average.
(3) Prices reported in this table include both amounts paid by third-party payers and amounts paid by the consumer as cost-sharing.
the market interacts with R&D decisions. How does the
market work? To whom do drug companies sell (indus-
trial organization)? What is competition in this market?
How do companies compete? Is competition compro-
mised by recent mergers? What are the effects of gener-
ics, intellectual property, PBMs and formularies, and
DTC advertising on the marketplace? At what point(s)
do the supply and demand sides of the market come
together?
The program will continue with an overview of the
demand side of the market. John M. Coster, Ph.D.,
R.Ph., vice president of federal and state affairs for the
National Association of Chain Drug Stores, will present
“The Private Market,” describing dynamics in the retail
market—pharmacies, hospitals, managed care organiza-
tions, mail order; across distribution channels—
wholesalers, buying groups, prime vendors; and within
the Internet.
Dan Mendelson, managing director of the Health
Strategies Consultancy, will present “The Federal
Market,” highlighting current government programs
(FFHBP, Medicaid Rebates, VA FSS, PHS programs)
and potential future government action, including the
intended and unintended consequences of a Medicare
prescription drug benefit and various price control bills.
Wrapping up the morning session will be Patricia M.
Danzon, Ph.D., the Celia Moh professor in the health
13 
care department at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School. Danzon will answer questions involving
“The International Market,” including the following: Are
international price comparisons valid? What can we learn
from them? How and why do prices differ between the
United States and other countries? For which products are
the differences greatest? Could the costs be more equita-
bly distributed? What are the higher U.S. prices actually
funding (R&D versus marketing)? What have been the
effects of GATT and NAFTA? What does the opening of
China mean for pharmaceutical markets?
The morning session will be followed immediately
by a luncheon briefing highlighting the findings of the
recently released DHHS report to the president, Pre-
scription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, and
Prices. John F. Hoadley, Ph.D., director of the divi-
sion of health financing policy in the office of the
assistant secretary for planning and evaluation will
provide an overview of the study and its findings. He
will be joined by other members of the research team
who will be on hand to answer questions.
PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING TERMS27
Actual Acquisition Cost (AAC)—Retail pharmacy reim-
bursement arrangements are often based on the AWP
(see below) plus a fee. Knowing that retailers no longer
pay the published AWP for prescription drugs, many
payers attempted to reduce the reimbursement by dis-
counting the AWP by 5% to as much as 20%. Because
this system penalized the pharmacies that are unable to
secure significant discounts from wholesalers, some
payers have instituted a payment schedule on the basis
of actual acquisition cost plus a fee. Billing complexi-
ties and schemes, however, make it difficult to ascertain
the actual acquisition cost.
Average Manufacturer’s Price (AMP)—This term was
developed by the drafters of OBRA 90 and is used to
describe the average price received by a manufacturer,
after discounts, for products sold to the retail class of
trade. The AMP is used for computing the rebates that
are paid to state Medicaid programs.
Average Wholesale Price (AWP)—Neither an average
price nor a price charged by wholesalers, this figure is
a vestige of earlier times. Few, if any, wholesalers even
consider AWP today when pricing their prescription
products. It is, however, commonly used by retailers
and others who dispense medications as the basis for
many pricing decisions. Due to its availability from
many sources, the AWP is often used as a surrogate for
actual prices when studying prescription price trends.
Cash Discounts—Most pharmaceutical firms offer incen-
tives to their customers for rapid payment of invoices. The
most common terms offered are a 2% discount if the full
bill is paid within 10 days of receiving the invoice. Thus
a wholesaler that pays the regular ex-factory price actually
pays only 98% of that price if it pays within 10 days. The
wholesaler that sells at cost plus 3%, then, is actually
charging a markup of roughly 5%.
Chargeback—This is the difference between the price
a wholesaler pays a manufacturer (see WAC) and a
lower contract price that has been negotiated by a hos-
pital or managed care organization. Because of com-
plexities of tracking products and some legal limita-
tions, the chargeback system was developed as a means
for discounted products to be sold through wholesalers.
The wholesaler purchases the product at the normal list
price and sells the product to hospitals or other contract
customers at the discount price. The difference is then
paid as a rebate to the wholesaler by the manufacturer.
This rebate is called the chargeback.
Class of Trade—Under federal law, all businesses that
sell to the same customer type must be eligible to re-
ceive equal pricing consideration, such as discounts and
special offers. To assure compliance with this law, most
pharmaceutical companies have developed lists of simi-
lar customers and grouped them into different classes of
trade. Pricing schedules and tactics are then developed
for each class of trade.
Direct Price—The price paid by retailers, before dis-
counts, for products from those manufacturers who sell
directly to nonwholesale accounts such as retailers, hos-
pitals, private practice physicians, and public health
clinics is called the direct price.
Earned Margin—Earned margin is a term used by some
retail pharmacists to describe the difference between the
AWP and the actual product cost, as paid to the whole-
saler or manufacturer.
Ex-Factory Price—This is the actual selling price, before
discounts, charged by the manufacturer. (see WAC).
Gross Profit (Margin)—The difference between acquisi-
tion or production cost of a product and its selling price
is known as the gross profit margin. The gross profit
margin does not include other costs of doing business.
Loss Leader—A loss leader is a retail promotional pricing
tactic in which the retailer charges a price that is below
cost to entice customers into the store, hoping that the
customers will make additional purchases while there. In
retail pharmacy, a loss leader is not always priced below
actual costs, but below AWP. It can, however, be argued
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that the transaction is indeed a loss when factoring in the
professional time and services required to fill a prescrip-
tion. Still, a pharmacy loss leader does not imply selling
the product below acquisition cost.
MAC—The MAC is the maximum allowable cost,
which is the federally set reimbursement rate for ge-
neric drugs used in the Medicaid system. Many other
payers use MAC systems as well. The federal MAC is
also called the FFP, which stands for federal financial
participation. It is set at 150% of the lowest generally
available price for generics.
Manufacturer’s List Price—As the name implies, the
list price is a price that has been published by a manu-
facturer. Many manufacturers make actual list prices
available only to wholesalers, providing a catalog that
contains AWPs to the nonwholesale trade (see Ex-Fac-
tory Price).
Net Price—Also known as “landed price,” this is the
price, or revenue, realized by a manufacturer after all
discounts have been granted.
Net Profit (Margin)—Net profit margin is the difference
in selling price and all costs associated with doing busi-
ness, allocated on a per-unit basis.
OBRA 90—The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, a law drafted by the Senate Committee on Aging,
requires manufactures to pay rebates to state and federal
governments for products used by Medicaid recipients.
Rebate—A rebate is a retroactive discount that is paid
to a customer after that customer has purchased the
product from a wholesaler or retailer. The rebate al-
lows the manufacturer to offer a lower price to some
customers without taking on the burden of special dis-
tribution mechanisms.
Standard Cost—The product costing system used by
most pharmaceutical firms is called “standard costing”
or “fully absorbed cost.” With this system, in addition
to the variable costs such as ingredients, packaging, and
direct labor, a portion of fixed cost (overhead) is allo-
cated to each product and package. This cost is allo-
cated on the basis of forecasts made at the beginning of
the fiscal year. Such a system assures that, when unit
volume increases, the incremental cost of a unit will
decline, while the incremental cost of a product with a
declining sales trend will increase significantly. It is not
uncommon for half or more of a product’s standard
costs to consist of this fixed cost allocation.
Wholesale Acquisition Price (WAC)—This term is used
by some publishers of pricing data to denote the ex-fac-
tory charge, before discounts to the wholesaler.
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